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In the recent public debate over the direction 
of the European integration process - 
following the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty and the onset of the euro zone crisis - 
arguments have somewhat polarised between 
the defenders and guardians of the 
"Community method", on the one hand, and, 
on the other, the advocates of a more 
intergovernmental approach to EU policy-
making - seen as either a desirable trend or an 
inevitable drift. 
In particular, the speech given by German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel on 2 November 
2010 at the College of Europe in Bruges - 
where equally seminal interventions were 
made in the past, starting with Margaret 
Thatcher's in 1988 - put forward the notion 
of a "Union method" (UM) as being more in 
line with the current state of affairs and 
policy development in the EU, with special 
emphasis on the role of the Member States. 
She defined it just as “coordinated action in a 
spirit of solidarity” - and gave energy policy 
as a good case in point1. 
Nomina sunt consequentia rerum, names are a 
consequence of things, one is tempted to say 
following Thomas Aquinas. Speculations 
now abound in the international media on 
whether Germany - for decades the key 
defender of an "ever closer" Union and of 
the role of common institutions and rules-
based order - has turned its back on the 
Brussels executive and put all its money (not 
only metaphorically) on the European 
                                                   
1
_http://www.coleurope.eu/template.asp?pagename=s
peeches 
Especially after the entry into force 
and subsequent implementation of 
the Lisbon Treaty, the traditional 
distinction (and opposition) 
between the so-called 'community' 
and 'inter-governmental' methods 
in EU policy-making is less and 
less relevant. Most common 
policies entail a 'mix' between 
them and different degrees of 
mutual contamination. Even the 
'Union method' recently proposed 
by Chancellor Angela Merkel raises 
more questions than it solves – 
although it may trigger a 
constructive debate on how best to 
address today's policy challenges. 
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Parliament and especially the Council - let 
alone the European Central Bank2. 
One is also tempted to say, however, that 
such polarisation and characterisations are 
largely instrumental, aimed as they often are 
at pulling the cover in one or the other 
direction at a time when crucial decisions are 
being taken at EU level.  
In fact, neither "method" fully corresponds 
to the realities of power and policy-making in 
today's European Union - which are, alas, 
much more complex than that, and certainly 
difficult to encapsulate in a single, all-
encompassing formula. Indeed the US motto, 
e pluribus unum, is hardly applicable here. 
Even in the past, and especially over the last 
two decades,  the so-called 'communitarian' 
and the 'intergovernmental' approaches often 
constituted rather "ideal-types" à la Max 
Weber than concrete methods or models - 
and they rarely operated in a 'pure', 
unadulterated form. Still, they have long 
monopolised (and often polarised) both 
academic research and public discourse. 
Maybe, therefore, it can be useful to resort to 
other methods and philosophers – starting 
with Descartes, with his drive to 'deconstruct' 
the acquis left by Aquinas, yet combined to 
some empirical evidence à la Hume3 - in 
order to clear the fog and unveil the myths 
                                                   
2 It is not only a matter of „shares‟, be they counted in 
terms of MEPs, (re-)weighted votes in the Council, or 
Bundesbank clout: a German national is Secretary-
General of the European Parliament (Klaus Welle) 
and another one is about to become Secretary-General 
of the Council (Uwe Corsepius, a close aide to 
Chancellor Merkel), succeeding Pierre de Boissieu.  
3 René Descartes' Discours de la méthode (1637) is 
universally considered the turning point in the history 
of modern philosophy, marking the beginning of 
rationalism. David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature 
(1739) balanced that off with a strong plea for 
empiricism.  
that currently wrap the public debate in and 
on the EU. 
Ex uno plures? 
What's in a name?, Shakespeare's Juliet 
famously said to her Romeo. Indeed, a 
stringent definition and agreed description of 
the "Community method" (CM) is hard to 
find. 
A few years ago Helen Wallace framed what 
she called the "traditional" CM – based on 
the precedent created by the early Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) – as follows:  
 a strong role delegated to the Commission 
in the design/brokering/execution of 
policy as well as in the management of its 
external ramifications; 
 an empowering role for the Council 
through strategic bargaining and package 
deals; 
 a locking-in of stakeholders (the sectoral 
interests) though a highly rewarding co-
option into the European process; 
 an engagement of national agencies as the 
subordinated operating arms of the agreed 
common regime; 
 a limitation of the influence of national 
MPs and of the opportunities for the 
European Parliament (EP) to impinge; 
 an occasional (but defining) intrusion by 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to 
reinforce the legal authority of the 
Community regime; 
 collective resourcing of the policy as an 
expression of sustained European 
'solidarity'. 
This template came to epitomise a form of 
'supranational' policy-making in which 
powers were transferred from the national 
level to the EC/EU. How far it actually fits 
with reality is a moot point, even in the case 
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of agriculture - and already the fisheries 
regime, that was meant to imitate the CAP, 
has turned out to be different. Nonetheless, 
this particular version of the CM shaped its 
'image' among both practitioners and 
commentators for quite a while4. 
Helen Wallace highlighted also the fact that, 
since the mid-1980s, the EC/EU started 
operating through at least two additional 
"methods". 
To begin with, as the competition regime 
took root and the Single Market developed, 
the call for and drive towards regulation 
became ever stronger. The strength of the 
European legal process, the machinery for 
promoting technical cooperation, and the 
relative distance from parliamentary 
interference were all factors that encouraged 
this trend further. Indeed, the EC/EU was 
particularly well equipped for generating an 
overarching regulatory framework that could 
combine cross-border standards with country 
differences. 
The main features of this regulatory 
"method" included: 
 the Commission as the architect and 
defender (in a quasi-judicial capacity) of 
regulatory objectives and rules, often in 
connection with stakeholders and experts; 
 the Council as a forum for agreeing 
minimum standards and the direction of 
harmonisation, complemented by mutual 
recognition of preferences and controls; 
 the ECJ as the main means of ensuring 
that the rules are applied reasonably fairly 
                                                   
4 H.Wallace, An Institutional Anatomy and Five Policy 
Modes, in H.Wallace, W.Wallace, M.A.Pollack (eds.), 
Policy-Making in the European Union, 5th edition, 
Oxford University Press, 2005, 49-90. Now see also 
R.Dehousse (ed.), The 'Community Method': Obstinate or 
Obsolete?, Palgrave-Macmillan, 2011. 
and evenly, backed by national courts for 
local application; 
 the EP as one of several means for 
considering also non-economic factors, 
with increasing legislative powers but little 
leverage on implementation. 
In addition, over the years the EU policy 
process has been increasingly caught in 
negotiations and controversies over the 
distributional impact of integration. In this on-
going process - that indirectly involved also 
the CAP - the introduction of "cohesion" 
policies marked a shift towards programmes 
aimed at tackling economic and social 
divergence and supporting the more 
backward regions and/or societal groups.  
In addition, various other spending 
instruments were introduced in fields such as 
research, with programmatic rather than re-
distributional aims.  
All in all, such distributional "method" 
comprised: 
 the Commission as the deviser of 
programmes, in partnership with sub-
national authorities and/or sectoral 
stakeholders and agencies; 
 national governments in the Council 
agreeing (under the pressure of various 
authorities and stakeholders) to a budget 
with some distributive elements; 
 a Parliament in which MEPs often 
constitute an additional source of pressure 
from territorial politics in their 
constituencies; 
 local and regional authorities benefiting 
from engaging in the EU arena and relying 
(since 1993) on their own institution, the 
Committee of the Regions (CoR).  
Incidentally, it was this opening for direct 
contacts between the European and the sub-
national levels of government that prompted 
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the coinage of the term "multi-level governance" 
to characterise the EU process more 
generally.  
More of the same?  
Finally, it is arguable that - over the past 
decade in particular - the spectrum has 
widened further by including the so-called 
"open method of coordination" (OMC), 
usually associated with the 2000 Lisbon 
Strategy on Growth and Jobs.  
It involved 'soft' policy incentives to shape 
behaviour at national level though 
'benchmarking' and systematic policy 
comparison, but without concrete 
enforcement and implementation tools. 
Employment policy at EU level is another case 
in point - albeit with some nuances. 
As such, the OMC can be considered as the 
closest thing to - or just a variation on - the 
"Intergovernmental method" (IM), but from 
within the scope of policies that are 
somewhat linked to the first 'pillar'. In 
retrospect, however, its impact has proved 
quite modest, as the dismal record of the 
Lisbon Strategy up to 2010 shows. 
For its part, what may be called "traditional" 
IM implies: 
 the active involvement of the European 
Council in setting the overall direction of 
policy; 
 the predominance of the Council of 
Ministers (or equivalent) in consolidating 
cooperation; 
 the limited/marginal role of the 
Commission, as compared to the CM and 
the other "methods" analysed above; 
 the basic exclusion of the EP (bar the 
budget) and the ECJ from the circle of 
involvement in policy formulation, 
execution and control; 
 the adoption of special arrangements for 
managing cooperation (in particular the 
Council Secretariat); 
 the relative opaqueness of the process, 
notably to national parliaments and 
citizens; 
 the capacity, on some occasions, to deliver 
substantive joint policy in areas where 
nothing existed previously. 
Yet again, even the IM presents a number of 
significant variations – especially if one takes 
into account such diverse areas as foreign and 
security policy (CFSP/ESDP) and justice and 
home affairs (JHA) – which, according to the 
Maastricht Treaty, coincided with the second 
and the third 'pillar', respectively, of the EU 
construction.  
In both cases the assets and competences of 
the Member States were (and still are) 
predominant. This said, even in the case of 
the former it is sometimes difficult to 
characterise EU "foreign policy" as 'purely' 
intergovernmental: the role played by Javier 
Solana in his decade in office as High 
Representative for CFSP (1999-2009) went 
often well beyond the representation of the 
lowest common denominator among the 
Member States. Also the structures resulting 
from that have become of a more 'hybrid' 
nature than they used to be previously5. 
Furthermore, the Commission played a 
distinctive role and carried out specific 
policies in external relations, development 
and humanitarian aid, and of course trade – 
let alone enlargement as a sort of foreign and 
                                                   
5 See the recent reappraisal by Jolyon Howorth, 
Decision-Making in Security and Defence Policy: Towards 
Supranational Intergovernmentalism?, KFG Working Paper, 
Freie Universitaet Berlin, no.25, March 2011.  
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security policy "by other means" (to 
paraphrase, this time, Carl von Clausewitz). 
As for JHA, different "methods" have 
developed over time and still in part coexist. 
The Schengen Agreements were first 
deliberately signed and implemented outside 
the EU treaty framework, then incorporated 
into it. Meanwhile and ever since, increased 
migration flows and mounting challenges 
from terrorism and cross-border crime have 
fostered demand for trans-national policy 
cooperation.  
This has led to drawing together different 
processes of cooperation, including the 
transfer of some JHA issues to the (now old) 
first 'pillar'. On top of that, a mixed pattern 
of what, yet again, Helen Wallace called 
"trans-governmentalism" remains in place, 
with the addition of a growing number of 
specialised agencies and legal agreements 
based on conventions – not to mention the 
so-called „Comitology‟. 
Another interesting case to consider is 
European Monetary Union (EMU). On the one 
hand, the European Central Bank and other 
related bodies have established a variation on 
the CM for monetary policy proper (with the 
ECB as a functional quasi-equivalent of the 
Commission). On the other hand, as far as 
macroeconomic policy is concerned, 
something similar to the OMC has long 
prevailed, while the role played by the 
Commission in the broader economic policy 
area has varied over time depending on the 
willingness and readiness of the Member 
States (starting with Germany) to have it on 
board – at least to date. 
It is also worth noting that the three domains 
mentioned above – CFSP, JHA and EMU – 
have been by far the most dynamic areas of 
EU policy development since 1999. In each 
case the EU framework has become more 
accepted, in a broad sense, but the detailed 
institutional arrangements have also become 
increasingly un-typical. 
This is also to say that all these “methods” 
tend also to overlap and 'migrate' - so to 
speak - in response to new policy challenges 
as well as to changing preferences and 
feedback effects among the Member States.  
Such overlaps and 'migrations' occur not only 
across but also within the old 'pillars', and 
produce a patchwork of modalities and 
procedures that is often cumbersome and 
illegible from outside (especially by ordinary 
EU citizens). Furthermore, the vector of 
such migrations is not always one and the 
same: whereas a number of policies areas 
have indeed been increasingly 
„communautarised‟ (albeit to different 
degrees), notably energy policy has moved in the 
opposite direction - especially if compared 
with the 1950s and 1960s. 
A further factor to consider in this context is 
the growing emphasis, also in the treaties, on 
so-called "subsidiarity". In retrospect, this 
can be seen as a stark warning by the 
Member States - not just their governments 
but also parliaments and even some regional 
bodies - to the Commission not to widen the 
scope of its interventions in areas of 
primarily national competence. Containing 
the expansion of the CM permits also to ring-
fence some policy domains from the 
jurisdiction of the ECJ. 
Last but certainly not least, with the 
introduction in stages – from Amsterdam 
(1999) to Lisbon (2009) – of "enhanced 
cooperation" (EnCo) an additional "method" 
has been brought to the fore: namely one 
that cuts across policy areas (albeit with 
significant variations) and lies at the juncture 
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between a decision-making procedure and a 
form of policy implementation. 
In a previous (academic) life, former Finnish 
Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb made a 
crucial and almost prophetic distinction 
between “pre-defined” and “enabling” EnCo 
clauses6.  
Accordingly, EMU is a case of the former – 
ante litteram, in a way – as it spells out in 
advance the domain it applies to, the 
participation criteria and the functional 
modalities of such cooperation. What the 
Lisbon Treaty calls "permanent structured 
cooperation" (PeSCo) in defence is 
potentially another one - albeit with a less 
stringent format, a less precise scope, and no 
evident obligation or deadline for 
implementation.  
The "enabling" form of EnCo is most likely 
to be applied within the JHA area: it was first 
threatened in late 2001 (but not put in place, 
leading instead to a compromise at 15) on the 
European arrest warrant; and it has been 
enforced recently for cross-border divorce 
cases. 
In principle, however, the "enabling" EnCo 
clauses are applicable also to other domains – 
as is happening now with the European 
Patent regime and may happen one day, 
possibly, with the corporate tax base. And 
one cannot entirely rule out that 
"differentiated" (or flexible, or multi-speed) 
integration becomes - within or without 
EnCo proper – a recurrent "method" for an 
ever larger Union. 
                                                   
6 A.C.-G.Stubb, A Categorisation of Differentiated 
Integration, “Journal of Common Market Studies”, no.2 
(34), June 1996, 283-295. 
Lisbon and after: unity in diversity? 
With the Lisbon Treaty, in a way, the plot has 
further thickened.  
In terms of decision-making proper, for 
instance, the process of extending co-decision 
(now called "ordinary legislative procedure") 
has continued and even intensified: it now 
applies to some 80 % of EU legislation, 
including also the original CAP. In and of 
itself, this alters significantly some of the key 
features of the "traditional" CM and blurs 
once familiar distinctions – as it applies to 
areas of both exclusive and shared EU 
competence. 
The recourse to qualified majority voting (QMV) 
has also widened and represents now the 
rule, with some significant exceptions still in 
place. However, all available empirical 
evidence from the analysis of voting 
behaviour in the Council shows that QMV 
works rather as a deterrent against 
obstruction than as a proper decision-making 
tool. In other words, the Member States tend 
to prefer consensual decisions - even when 
they could do otherwise, as in trade matters - 
and resort to a vote (typically on 
distributional, and sometimes regulatory, 
issues) only and mainly for domestic political 
purposes7. 
As already mentioned above, EnCo has also 
been employed as a deterrent against gridlock 
and as a facilitator of decisions.  
For its part, constructive [qualified] abstention has 
been used only once since it was introduced 
                                                   
7 Germany, of all countries, is a famous case in point, 
as it was the most frequent 'loser' in Council votes 
throughout the 1990s. Calling a vote and being (seen) 
in a minority was only meant to show to domestic 
stakeholders that the government had defended 
specific national interests (albeit in vain), while the 
overarching common/general interest – as defined 
also by Germany - had eventually prevailed. 
  
 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
 
7 
 
with the Amsterdam Treaty - notably when 
the EU-27 launched the EULEX operation 
in Kosovo in February 2008 (and Cyprus 
abstained). Interestingly, however, it is now 
being considered as a tool in the framework 
of the so-called "mutual agreement" 
procedure just adopted for the Euro Plus 
Pact.  
As a result, the picture is even less clear-cut 
in terms of "methods". If previously the 
distinctions were already less of nature than 
of degree8, now they are further blurred and 
increasingly problematic. 
On the one hand – banal as it may sound – 
the treaty has given full personality to the 
Union, thus indirectly 'terminating' the 
Community proper. At least formally, 
therefore, it is inappropriate to continue 
referring to the CM. A bit less formalistically, 
it is arguable that the CM worked best when 
the Member States agreed in advance on the 
policy goals to pursue through it – as a means 
to a shared end, that is, rather than a magical 
device to overcome fundamental differences. 
It is equally arguable that such agreement has 
been easier to achieve at 6/9/12 than at 
15/25/27: in other words, the increasing 
„hybridisation‟ and cross-contamination of 
"methods" is also the combined effect of 
decreasing policy convergence and declining 
internal homogeneity inside the EU. 
On the other hand, especially in the field of 
foreign policy and external relations, the 
multi-hatted role of HR/VP Catherine 
Ashton as well as the operation of the three-
armed European External Action Service 
(EEAS) supporting her9 do indeed challenge 
                                                   
8 See the excellent analysis by Philippe de Schoutheete, 
Mode de decision dans l'Union, "Les Brefs", Notre 
Europe, no.24. mars 2011.  
9 For a preliminary assessment see A.Missiroli, The EU 
'Foreign Service': Under Construction, RSCAS Policy 
all traded views and conventional 
approaches. And even the function carried 
out (and the interpretation given to it) by 
Herman Van Rompuy as President of the 
European Council may end up putting into 
question - at least in terms of substance - the 
contours of the "traditional" IM, as already 
did Solana's. 
There are, of course, other plausible reasons 
for the growing diversification and 
multiplication of "methods" and the relative 
decline of the old CM.  
To start with, the change in the composition 
of the Commission - with one Commissioner 
per Member State since 2004 - has de facto 
entailed a political disinvestment on the part 
of the bigger EU countries, which used to 
have two representatives inside the college 
(and often from different political camps, 
which further increased its legitimacy). 
Germany's progressive detachment, in 
particular, can be attributed also to the 
resulting mismatch between its formal weight 
in the college (now equal to that of mini-
States) and its substantial weight in terms of 
population and GDP, which is now reflected 
both in the EP and in the new voting system 
for the Council (as from 2014) - but no 
longer in the Commission. 
Moreover, especially over the past few years, 
decision-making in the EU at large has 
become increasingly "presidentialised". This 
is reflected in the formalisation of the 
European Council as an institution in its own 
right - prompted by the Lisbon Treaty - but 
also in the actual transfer of political deal-
making from key Council formations 
(especially the GAERC and now also the 
ECOFIN) to the meetings of Heads of State 
and Government – which have indeed 
                                                                           
Papers, no.4/2010, Robert Schuman Centre for 
Advanced Studies, EUI.   
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become ever more frequent. Such mounting 
politicisation and public exposure have 
further weakened the CM, which was 
designed to find apparently technical 
solutions to political problems and to project 
policy choices long rather than short term. 
Finally, the growing power(s) of the EP will 
probably have a much bigger impact on all 
"methods" than previously imagined. Not 
only have the new prerogatives of MEPs just 
started being exercised quite assertively, but 
some of these are also being used to explore 
the possibility of acquiring additional ones in 
the process. This would have far-reaching 
implications – in "methodological" as well as 
systemic terms – for all other institutional 
players in the EU, generating unexpected 
outcomes and unintended consequences. 
A tale of two methods? 
This is why the current European public 
"discourse on methods" and the resulting 
polarisation between CM and IM - with 
Merkel's UM as a dark horse - appear 
superficial and, above all, not to the point. 
They also sound artificial and mostly tactical 
(regardless of the good intentions and 
candour of some of the discussants). But they 
are also dangerous as they may blur the real 
terms of the policy debate and force players 
to take sides, thus making the construction of 
a viable consensus and the enforcement of 
effective policies more elusive. 
Two points deserve to be made in this 
respect. First, the tension between the CM 
and IM has never been - and should not 
become now - a 'zero-sum' game. True, the 
Legal Services of the Council and the 
Commission seem to engage sometimes in 
pre-emptive strikes and trench warfare - and 
to act as “guardians of the methods” - when 
it comes to legal competences. Yet policy 
tools rarely lie in one camp only, and the 
sheer scale of the current challenges makes 
them all indispensable. It is their most 
suitable „mix‟ that should be addressed, not 
the relative size and visibility of each 
ingredient.  
Second, even if one accepts that the CM lies 
at one end of the spectrum and the IM at the 
other - in a sort of "ideal-typical" continuum 
- the reality and the practice of EU policy-
making show that actual procedures often fall 
in-between and, even more importantly, 
continue to move and evolve along that line. 
Indeed, it is no secret that European 
integration has tested and taken different 
avenues over time – and, with and after the 
Lisbon Treaty, the old set of (more or less) 
distinguishable "methods" is truly gone. 
As a consequence, Chancellor Merkel's fairly 
vague reference to an emerging "Union 
method" - yet again, unfortunately, in the 
singular form - should rather be taken as an 
invitation to consider the impact of the ever 
growing areas of shared competence on EU 
policy-making. It could also be seized as an 
opportunity to streamline the current 
proliferation of 'hybrid' procedures and 
reassess the continuing (if ghostly) presence 
and resilience of the old 'pillars', despite their 
formal suppression by the Lisbon Treaty.  
Seen by many in the CM camp as a wolf in 
sheep's clothing, the UM is actually little 
more than a blank sheet, especially if cleared 
of the inevitable concessions to the 2009 
German Constitutional Court's ruling on the 
Lisbon Treaty. The real debate (and 
controversy) should therefore focus on how 
to fill that sheet with recipes which may 
prove both effective and beneficial for the 
overall integration process. 
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This is why a strong dose of pragmatism and 
open-mindedness is absolutely necessary - 
but probably not sufficient. 
Former US President Bill Clinton recently 
argued that the 21st century demands a 
"whatever works" approach. In and for the 
EU, however, such naked pragmatism needs 
to be combined with hard evidence regarding 
policy effectiveness - which may result in 
slightly different recipes according to the 
area(s) in question - as well as robust 
confidence-building measures between 
institutions, Member States and also citizens. 
Mutual trust and collective determination are 
essential ingredients for any current or future 
recipe, and especially the former – mutual 
trust – has been severely dented by the 
sovereign debt crisis. 
One thing, however, is certain: a continuing 
controversy over the 'optimal' method - as 
though there was a one-size-fits-all approach 
to the complex policy challenges of our time 
- is useless and even counterproductive. 
No past or contemporary philosopher seems 
able to offer a convincing method to meet 
this particular demand, with the possible 
exception of Karl Popper and his 
evolutionary epistemology whereby not only 
our knowledge but also our aims and 
standards grow through critical tests and an 
unending process of "trial and error"10. 
While continuing the inquiry, therefore, it 
may be wiser at this stage to resort to Lev 
Tolstoi's Anna Karenina (1877) and its famous 
opening line:  
“happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is 
unhappy in its own way" 
                                                   
10 Articulated in his Conjectures and Refutations (1963), it 
is widely considered the foundation of 'critical 
rationalism' and the liberal approach to the evolution 
of scientific knowledge. 
Family life in the EU lies somewhere in the 
middle: while e pluribus unum appears an 
impossible goal, at least for now, the pursuit 
of (collective) happiness remains a legitimate 
and worthy one. 
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